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Abstract 
This article summarises the empirical results of a study on the scale, nature and outcome of 
corruption cases in the Netherlands. It turns out that the number of convictions of corruption in 
the Netherlands has remained very stable in recent decades. After research on the nature of 
corruption, it is concluded that civil servants who are found to be susceptible to corruption tend 
not to be low-profile officials, but rather personalities with a reputation in the civil service 
organisation for being noticeable, colourful and astute ‘fixers’. They frequently possess or 
demand the freedom to arrange matters on their own and are known as thorough and enterprising 
people. The research material further shows that the briber and the bribed usually know each 
other well before the violation of integrity occurs. This is not confined to business or instrumental 
relationships, because an element of friendship or affection is regularly involved. Something that 
plays a role in this setting is that trust is pivotal to prolonged corruption relationships. After 
research on the outcome of corruption cases, it is concluded that criminal prosecutions once 
instituted result, in nine out of ten corruption cases, in a criminal conviction. Although suspects 
are sometimes acquitted on some counts, complete acquittals are rare. The punishment most 
frequently handed down is a community service order. Combinations with other punishments 
occur regularly, with a custodial sentence or fine often being suspended. An average of five civil 
servants and three bribers actually end up behind bars each year. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information gathered by the non-governmental organisation Transparency International (TI) has 
shown for many years that the Netherlands ranks among the world’s least corruption-prone 
countries. As this finding is based on a perceptions index, it probably says more about how 
people view the Netherlands than about the real nature and scale of corruption in the country. 
Empirical research into this subject is scarce in the Netherlands. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the report published by the Groupe d’Etats contre la Corruption of the Council of Europe 
(Greco, 2003) concluded that the picture of public sector corruption in the Netherlands was 
fragmented and incomplete. One of this working group’s recommendations was that the Dutch 
authorities should promote research capable of casting greater light on the nature and scale of 
corruption. This recommendation was in tune with initiatives by the Dutch Cabinet and 
Parliament to obtain more clarity about the scale, nature and outcome of corruption cases in the 
Netherlands. The Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry of Justice 
translated this policy intention into an outline of the envisaged approach to the research. The 
research was conducted in 2004 and 2005 by the VU University Amsterdam. This article 
summarises the empirical results of the study. It concludes by briefly putting the results into 
perspective. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STRUCTURE 
The questions formulated by the Ministry of Justice were turned into a research plan. The plan 
involved first identifying and summarising existing knowledge, followed by the formulation of 
some new research questions designed to add knowledge about the scale, the nature and the 
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handling of cases of corruption in the public sector. The issue of the scale of corruption in public 
administration in the Netherlands was translated into questions that addressed the number of 
corruption investigations conducted in this field and how they were followed up. Essentially, the 
emphasis was on inventorying the number of internal investigations carried out into public sector 
corruption. Information on this subject was already available about municipalities and the police. 
Therefore, the objective was to find out how many corruption investigations had been carried out 
by institutions in other sectors of the public administration. With a view to obtaining this 
information, a questionnaire was sent to ministries, provincial authorities, the judiciary, water 
boards and autonomous administrative authorities. To enable comparison, the terminology and 
questionnaire items were harmonised as closely as possible with the survey conducted among 
municipal secretaries in 2003. A total of 341 public sector organisations received the letter; of 
these, 71% provided information about the number of internal corruption investigations. It has to 
be stressed however, that in the end, asking about ‘official’ internal investigations, is also asking 
about perceptions – not the perceptions of experts, such as those whose views form the basis of 
TI’s perceptions index, but the perceptions of administrators who keep official records and who 
filled out our questionnaire. In our research we asked about ‘serious suspicions of corruption, 
leading to some form of investigation’. It is clear that however well ‘serious suspicions’ and 
‘some form of investigation’ are defined, they can be perceived differently in different 
organisations. It is certainly possible that in organisation A every suspicion is officially looked 
into and clearly documented; whereas in organisation B, when after one interview by a supervisor 
it becomes clear that her once serious suspicions were groundless, she forgets about the case and 
does not make an official record of it. 
  The issue of the nature of corruption in public administration in the Netherlands was 
broken down into distinct questions about the characteristics of corruption cases. The questions 
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centred on which sectors of the public administration were involved; who discovered and 
reported the corruption; what was required of the officials; what gifts, services or promises were 
given or made; the characteristics of the briber and the bribed and how their relationship could be 
typified. The emphasis when posing these questions was on case study research. The cases 
consisted of almost all investigations undertaken by the National Police Internal Investigation 
Department (NPIID) in the period between 2000 and 2003 and that concluded that there were 
strong grounds for suspicion of corruption. 
 A number of distinct questions were devised to address the issue of cases of suspected 
corruption were handled. The questions concerned the outcome of those cases that resulted in 
criminal investigations. In addition, several facets of the input, throughput, output and outcome of 
cases reported to the Public Prosecution Service were examined. In this part of the research, we 
used a variety of data gathering techniques, and a variety of sources, such as the Public 
Prosecution Service’s data interrogation system, dossiers of current and completed investigations, 
and interviews. ‘Doing’ can obviously also mean that an official fails to do something (see for 
example: Kaptein, 2001, Lasthuizen et al., 2002, Vinkers, 2003). 
 
SCALE 
The first step towards gauging the scale of corruption was to examine suspicions arising from 
episodes people had observed in their own working environments. There was no research 
embracing the entire Dutch public administration apparatus that focused specifically on 
corruption. However, studies within the police service and among the Dutch labour force as a 
whole revealed regular observation of integrity violations like nepotism and the advantaging of 
friends and family. 
 This confronts us with the question of precisely how corruption should be defined. After 
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all, this strongly influences perception. According to the definition applied in this research, a 
corrupt civil servant or politician is one involved in providing, requesting or obtaining private 
favours or promises, where the briber aims to influence what the bribed party does in his/her 
official capacity. Advantaging friends and family from outside the organisation may fall within 
the same definition; the same goes for forms of nepotism. Corruption in this wide sense is 
anything but exceptional, according to research into what employees notice in their working 
environments. In a more specific sense, however, corruption involving important decisions and 
substantial personal gain is fairly rare, at least when measured by instances reported from within 
the working environment. 
 The picture of suspicions of corruption becomes firmer when we focus on internal 
investigations. By combining the outcomes of the survey carried out a few years ago among 
Dutch municipalities, with the data gathered through the present research, we determined the 
bandwidths of the number of internal investigations into corruption in the public administration. 
Table 1 shows the most important findings. 
 
Table 1: Estimate of the number of internal corruption investigations per year 
 
 
 internal 
corruption investigations 
 
number     investigation  
per year     period  
Corruption 
investigations per 
1000 employees 
per year 
 
Ministries  
Provinces 
Judiciary 
Water boards 
Autonomous 
administrative 
authorities 
Municipalities 
 
 43         (1999-2003) 
   2         (1999-2003) 
   1         (1999-2003) 
   2         (1999-2003) 
    
 
   3         (1999-2003) 
 61         (1998-2002)  
 
0.19 
0.13 
0.10 
0.17 
 
 
0.06 
0.31 
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Police 
Prison service 
 
 13         (1999-2000) 
   5         (1997-1999) 
0.22 
 
Total 130                          
 
 
 The absolute numbers may possibly create the impression that municipalities (61 
investigations) and ministries (43 investigations) are relatively vulnerable public sector 
organisations. However, if we discount the number of employees covered by this examination, 
we can see that the differences are not very large. Relatively speaking there are slightly more 
corruption investigations in municipalities, but that is hardly surprising given their range of duties 
and their numerous direct contacts with the public and companies. Autonomous administrative 
authorities have relatively few corruption investigations. This is surprising because they are 
organisations that operate at arm’s length from the classical public sector and, they are more 
likely than these other sectors to have to operate in accordance with market criteria. 
 The research conducted among municipalities and among the other parts of the public 
administration show roughly the same distribution between investigations handled internally and 
cases reported to the police and the judicial authorities: the ratio is 60%-40%. This means that of 
the 130 investigations a year, more than 50 cases of suspected corruption are reported to the 
police and the judicial authorities. 
 All in all, the new research confirms the picture that emerged from earlier studies, namely 
that the data concerning internal and criminal investigations suggest that the scale of public sector 
corruption, defined as bribery, must be put into perspective. However, there is no reason for 
complacency. A comparison of the number of internal and criminal investigations on the one 
hand, and the data concerning what people perceive in their working environments on the other, 
points to the conclusion that there is a different and more serious response to behaviour 
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‘officially’ considered corruption than to behaviour which, while not formally assigned to that 
category, comes very close to it, such as nepotism, conflicts of interest and collusion (Heuvel, 
1998). People disagree about the norms that determine whether someone is corrupt, not about the 
reprehensiveness of ‘corruption’. So as soon as someone is labeled ‘corrupt,’ he or she is morally 
judged in a negative way. Corruption is a morally loaded term. Just as ‘integrity’ is a (morally) 
positive label and everyone seeks it, so corruption is a negative label. Since our views about 
morality differ in many respects, corruption is also a contested term (Graaf, 2006, Hoetjes, 1982, 
Johnston, 1996). People therefore do not like to use the term ‘corruption’. Even civil servants 
who have been convicted in court for taking bribes, hardly ever perceive themselves as ‘corrupt’ 
(Graaf, 2006, Dohmen and Verlaan, 2004). Nor is complacency justified if we take the integrity 
and corruption paradox into consideration (more attention to corruption, and more internal 
investigations within an organisation, suggest a more strenuous fight against the phenomenon, 
not more of it (Huberts and Lasthuizen, 2005)): it turned out from our research among 
municipalities that those with more corruption investigations were more alert and more assiduous 
in looking for possible cases, not that they had more corrupt employees. The city of Amsterdam 
is unique in the Netherlands in having had a special Integrity Bureau since 1997; and it has a 
much more active integrity policy than other municipalities – a policy that involves not just 
prevention, but also the detection of corruption. It turns out that the number of internal 
investigations of corruption, fraud and theft in Amsterdam rose sharply in the period 1997 to 
2003, whereas the average number of investigations in other cities (comparable in size), stayed 
roughly the same over the period. Amsterdam seems awake, whereas other cities are dozing off. 
As stated earlier in this article, there seems to be a difference between the municipalities, in their 
perceptions of integrity and corruption. 
 The number of convictions of corruption in the Netherlands has remained very stable in 
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recent decades. One could conclude from this, that actual corruption is also very stable. However, 
the investigative capacities of the National Police Internal Investigation Department (NPIID) 
have remained much the same in recent decades. Furthermore, the NPIID has other duties, 
besides investigating corruption cases. Sometimes these other duties – like investigating a fire in 
a detention centre in 2006, in which eleven prisoners died – have priority. During parliamentary 
investigations into the so-called construction fraud in 2001, many suspicions of corruption 
against politicians and civil servants came to the fore. Only a limited number of these cases – that 
is, six, all involving officials from the provinces of Zuid-Holland and Noord-Holland – led to 
criminal investigations. These were all cases in which the limited detection capacities of the 
NPIID made it possible to obtain enough evidence, in a relatively short period, to have a 
reasonable chance of conviction. All of the cases were related to the whistleblower Ad Bos, 
without whom there would have been no parliamentary investigations. The question is, if the 
whistleblower had been from a different province, would the most criminal cases of corrupt 
officials then have come from that other province? If you do not look for something, you will not 
find it. 
  
THE NATURE OF CORRUPTION 
The survey conducted to find out the numbers of internal corruption investigations revealed that 
some official departments and procedures are more prone to corruption than others. They 
concern: the procurement of goods and services; the issuing of licences; the granting of subsidies; 
the awarding of tenders (contracting); confidential information (and its treatment) and internal 
management; goods and money. Other research confirms this picture, although it also points to 
vulnerability in the area of passports, visas, residency permits and similar documents (see also: 
Nelen and Nieuwendijk, 2003). 
 9 
 Surprisingly, a number of policy fields considered vulnerable (Heywood, 1997, Caiden et 
al., 2001, Huberts, 1996, Nelen and Nieuwendijk, 2003) are virtually absent from the national 
overview of corruption investigations we have presented. In particular, little information is 
available about investigations in sectors like agriculture, nature management, the environment, 
social security and public housing. Given the major financial and other interests at stake in these 
sectors, and the strict legislation and supervision to which they are subject, it is highly 
implausible that these fields have remained untouched by public sector corruption. Rather, there 
seems to be an insufficient focus on the phenomenon of corruption in these sectors. 
 The survey conducted among ministries, provinces, the judiciary, water boards and 
autonomous administrative authorities reveals that, among those that have been the subject of a 
corruption investigation in these settings, very few are administrators or politicians. The situation 
is different at municipal level, where corruption investigations relatively more often concern the 
conduct of a local politician, especially in smaller municipalities. The ten case studies also 
included instances of corruption allegations against aldermen. These cases mainly concerned 
relationships with the local business community, but also private interests such as licence 
applications. 
 The new empirical research confirms the findings of other studies, namely that most 
corruption investigations concern operational employees. In terms of absolute numbers, this is 
definitely not a surprising finding. After all, far more civil servants work at operational level than 
at managerial level. Despite this relativisation, we need to bear in mind that the threshold for civil 
servants for reporting the suspected corruption of a colleague might be lower than that for 
blowing the whistle on misconduct by their superiors (Near and Miceli, 1996). Moreover, 
because of their education, experience and position, managers might possess more refined 
neutralisation techniques than operational civil servants do for legitimising their own behaviour 
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and thus dispelling suspicions. Also, the higher one is in a hierarchy, the less clearly are duties 
defined, and thus the harder it is to investigate and prove corruption.  
 However, the notion that managers can almost completely escape corruption 
investigations was not confirmed by the survey of the Dutch public administration apparatus. 
Approximately one third of the corruption investigations were found to focus on managers, 
although it should be noted that the questions did not specify at what level the manager worked. 
This makes it impossible to determine whether the people involved worked at the top, or ranked 
among the middle managers. However, the case studies suggest that people at the very top figure 
only incidentally in the overall picture. 
 Another matter is the extent to which a corrupt civil servant cooperates or colludes with 
others or acts mainly on his own. The number of persons involved in each internal corruption 
investigation shows that in the vast majority of cases just one person is involved. Over five years, 
the newly examined authorities reported 16 investigations that concerned three or more persons. 
Corruption ‘in collusion’ thus appears to be exceptional, although this pronouncement needs to 
be qualified. After all, it is conceivable that internal investigations will – rightly or wrongly – 
quickly have focused on one ‘rotten apple’. The present study provides no conclusive answer to 
this question. 
 The case studies confirmed the picture obtained from other research that civil servants 
who are found to be susceptible to corruption tend not to be low-profile officials, but rather 
personalities with a reputation in the civil service organisation for being noticeable, colourful and 
astute ‘fixers’. They frequently possess or demand the freedom to arrange matters on their own 
and are known as thorough and enterprising people. 
 The research material further shows that the briber and the bribed usually know each other 
well before the violation of integrity occurs. This is not confined to business or instrumental 
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relationships, because an element of friendship or affection is regularly involved. Something that 
plays a role in this setting is that trust is pivotal to prolonged corruption relationships. It is no 
coincidence that bridges are sometimes built between civil servants and the outside world via 
partners, family members or friends. Corruption in these situations is not so much the result of a 
civil servant who is out to make a profit, but is more likely to ensue from a conflict between the 
moral obligations in the official’s own micro-sphere (the circle of family and friends) and the 
ethics of public administration. Taken-for-granted close relationships between governmental 
organisations and the private sector also play a role in several cases (Heuvel et al., 2002). There 
is a collision of moral values and expectations, each with its own logic and comprehensibility. If 
a civil servant or politician is unable to deal with this situation, there will be the risk of a conflict 
of interests, one that is unacceptable in terms of the public interest. 
 The close interweaving of the public and private sectors also plays a role in some cases. 
Having professional and private dealings with stakeholder businesses creates blurred dividing 
lines and problems, with the inevitable risk of corruption. The relationship between doing 
something, and something being done in return, is often an indirect one. Services or favours are 
exchanged in a prolonged relationship, but the exchange does not occur at the same time or as a 
direct quid pro quo. Very large amounts are seldom involved. 
 
THE HANDLING OF CORRUPTION CASES 
Our study showed clearly that the police force conducts most criminal investigations into 
corruption. The subjects of these investigations tend to be officials attached to other government 
departments rather than police personnel. The National Police Internal Investigation Department 
also carries out a substantial proportion of the investigations. Apart from the Fiscal Intelligence 
and Investigation Department (Economic Crimes Division), government agencies with special 
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investigative powers are seldom involved in investigating corruption. 
 Prosecutions are brought against one or more of the main suspects in roughly one third of 
all criminal investigations. It was deduced from the databases of the Public Prosecution Service 
that each year an average of 33 people – not just civil servants suspected of having been bribed, 
but in some cases also the suspected bribers – are brought before the courts. When it drops 
charges the Public Prosecution Service appears to make significant allowance for the possibility 
of taking action other than criminal prosecution: no legal action is taken if a competent authority 
has already taken or plans to take disciplinary measures against a civil servant and such measures 
are held to be sufficient from society’s point of view. Therefore, the only persons who appear 
before a criminal court are those for whom – in the opinion of the Public Prosecution Service – 
the public interest demands a court judgement and the evidential position is strong enough. 
 Criminal prosecutions were brought in about half of all the cases that were forwarded to 
the Public Prosecution Service in the period from 1994 to 2003 and were based at least in part on 
anti-corruption laws. Compared with the research conducted by Hoetjes (1991) thirteen years 
ago, the number of prosecutions has almost doubled. 
 Criminal prosecutions once instituted result, in nine out of ten corruption cases, in a 
criminal conviction. Although suspects are sometimes acquitted on some counts – including the 
corruption charges in some instances – complete acquittals are rare. 
 The punishment most frequently handed down is a community service order. 
Combinations with other punishments occur regularly, with a custodial sentence or fine often 
being suspended. Over a period of ten years, the courts ordered custodial sentences to be carried 
out for 77 persons, including 49 civil servants. Therefore, an average of five civil servants and 
three bribers actually end up behind bars each year. 
 The differences between the sentences demanded by public prosecutors, and initial 
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sentences given by the courts, are mainly that the former request immediate custodial sentences 
and/or fines while the latter hand down suspended forms of punishment. The courts appear to be 
guided mainly by the organisational contexts that allow the corruption to occur and by the 
consequences that the individual faces under labour law (usually dismissal). 
 The figure below is a diagrammatical representation showing the outcome of corruption 
cases. 
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 The difficulties involved in investigating and prosecuting public sector corruption are 
inextricably linked to the type of crime involved. From a technical point of view, investigators 
are often handicapped by the circumstance that in many cases a considerable amount of time 
separates the moment when corruption signals first start bubbling to the surface in an 
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organisation, and an actual investigation gets underway. Consequently, investigators frequently 
have to delve back a number of years into the past, with all the difficulties this entails. Add to this 
the circumstance that suspects often prefer to remain silent and that the civil service apparatus is 
not always overly cooperative, and it becomes clear that corruption investigations are intrinsically 
difficult. What is more our interviews, and the literature we examined, revealed that controlling 
and carrying out corruption investigations requires improvement in terms of quality and 
continuity. For its part, the Public Prosecution Service can fall into line with developments 
already initiated in the organisation’s current process of change. In particular, there should be 
more and better forms of inter-collegial testing to ensure that important decisions concerning 
criminal prosecutions are not based solely on the insights of individual public prosecutors, 
sometimes prompted by the leader of the investigation team. 
 
CORRUPTION MONITOR 
One of the questions the project examined was whether a corruption monitor could help provide a 
better picture of the corruption problem and the way it is addressed. We can answer this question 
in the affirmative. The research conducted provides some stepping stones (the data must be kept 
up-to-date) which we would couple with the recommendation to try some new investigative 
strategies. One such recommendation would be to ask civil servants directly about their own 
experiences with bribery (using methods that guarantee anonymity). Another would be to 
experiment with large-scale anonymous public surveys (which have been used little if at all in the 
investigation of corruption) This would certainly be advantageous if the questions were not 
confined solely to corruption, but also covered integrity violations in the wider sense. This latter 
point underscores the need to avoid examining corruption as a stand-alone phenomenon, but to 
examine it, rather, in conjunction with other kinds of violations of integrity. There are various 
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reasons for adopting such an approach – such as the fact that corruption often borders on or is 
accompanied by numerous other violations of integrity, or that corrupt relationships often begin 
relatively insignificantly and innocently, after which, step-by-step, they become more intense and 
the stakes get higher. This slippery slope suggests that less serious integrity violations precede 
corruption. 
 
THE CORRUPTION GLASS 
The research into corruption we have summarised in this article is the most comprehensive of its 
kind conducted over the past few decades in the Netherlands. What makes the research special is 
that it was carried out through cooperation between public administration experts and 
criminologists and that a variety of research and data gathering methods were used to address the 
scale, nature and settlement of public sector corruption in the Netherlands.  
 It is important to remember what this corruption research was all about. Corruption is 
about providing, requesting or obtaining private favours with a view to a person doing or not 
doing something in their official capacity. Our research concerns corruption in the sense of 
bribing and being bribed.  
 We are the first to acknowledge that the research methodologies have their limitations. 
Hard figures about the exact extent of corruption cannot be given. There is no research 
methodology that can completely overcome the problem of dark numbers (Sampford et al., 
2006), partly because the crime of corruption knows no direct victims. Researchers therefore 
always have to rely on more indirect research methods. 
 The research report leaked out and on its front page, the daily newspaper NRC 
Handelsblad claimed, on the basis of the study, ‘Five percent of politicians are corrupt’. Many 
media organisations, columnists, politicians, policymakers and academics responded to the 
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headline, which created the impression that it embodied an important conclusion. However, this 
5% concerns the opinion of civil servants, i.e. it is reputational data, not the factual situation. You 
cannot draw from this any conclusions about the ‘true’ scale of corruption. This does not alter the 
fact that politicians should occasionally give some thought to the reasons for their rather negative 
reputation. 
 So, how bad is corruption in the Netherlands? First of all, the glass is clearly not empty. 
The research we have reported in this article, as well as information from the past, teaches us that 
those who look for corruption in the Netherlands will find it. The research material does not 
provide any reason for complacency or for sitting back and doing nothing. We focused on the 
number of corruption investigations conducted by the authorities themselves. We know that each 
year there are approximately 130 internal corruption investigations. Given the total number of 
civil servants and politicians, this does not appear to be such a bad figure. Out of every 10,000 
employees, only a few are the subject of an internal investigation each year. Yet every second 
working day a new corruption investigation begins somewhere in the governmental apparatus in 
the Netherlands. Is the glass therefore half full? If one takes the position that every case is one too 
many, yes. However, the glass is clearly not completely full. Interpretations to the effect that the 
Netherlands has a worryingly large number of corrupt politicians and civil servants are at odds 
with the results of the research. By the same token, the research has not demonstrated that there is 
nothing to worry about when it comes to integrity issues in public administration in the 
Netherlands. We conclude that the glass is both ‘half full’ and ‘half empty.’  
 Corruption must certainly be taken seriously. The corruption paradox and the Amsterdam 
example make clear that government organisations that allow their attention to corruption and 
other integrity violations to wander run serious risks. Many municipalities, provinces and 
ministries report that in recent years they have not conducted any investigations whatsoever into 
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corruption or fraud (!). This concerns many large government organisations, with thousands of 
employees. Moreover, investigations are rare in some sectors – such as social security, nature, the 
environment and public housing – that are usually considered vulnerable (Huberts, 1996). To 
conduct few if any investigations is to stretch credibility. It is time for these authorities to realise 
this and wake up. The relevant ministers concerned should also address this matter. Somebody 
who looks and finds something cannot attract blame; but somebody who doesn’t even look 
certainly has something to explain. We do not call for a corruption witch hunt with its clear 
dangers (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996); and we would like to warn against ‘integritism’ 
(Huberts, 2005) – but not doing anything at all is not wise.  
 Other considerations too warn against complacency. The research had to be confined to 
corruption in the narrow sense (bribery). However, integrity is about much more besides 
corruption. It also touches on conflicts of interest, abuses of power, manipulation of information, 
greasing palms and lionising, intimidation and discrimination and misconduct in a person’s 
private life. We believe it would be a crucial error to confine the acquisition of knowledge and 
policymaking to corruption in the narrow sense. Ministers recently put forward an Anti-
Corruption Policy Memorandum and, at the time of writing, the lower house of Parliament was 
due to discuss the fight against corruption shortly thereafter. But the time has come for an 
integrity policy memorandum and for a policy that promotes integrity. 
 In political science and the science of public administration, too, we believe, there is a 
need for far more attention to this subject. Courses and research are dominated by the technical 
side of politics and administration, while the ethical side receives far less attention.  
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Note 
1 
This article presents a summary of the principal results contained in the book, Corruptie in het 
Nederlandse openbaar bestuur (Utrecht: Lemma, 2005). Readers are invited to refer to the book 
for an overview of existing research with numerous references. 
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